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 Abstract:  This essay analyses the consequences of contested multilateralism (CM) 
for the level of constitutionalisation of speciﬁ c multilateral institutions. We argue 
that CM has implications for institutions’ constitutional quality in particular if it 
is polity-driven and not (merely) policy-driven, that is, when actors’ employment 
of alternative institutions stems from their dissatisfaction with the political 
order of an institution rather than individual policies. Given the co-existence of 
constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised multilateral institutions in today’s 
international order, state and non-state actors can use alternative institutions 
to contest the constraining or discretionary character of an institution’s polity. We 
hold that CM is likely to have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation 
of multilateral institutions if it is employed ‘top-down’ by states to enhance their 
freedom to wield discretionary authority, but that it is likely to have positive 
consequence if it is employed ‘bottom-up’ by society actors to constrain the exercise 
of discretionary authority through multilateral institutions. We illustrate the empirical 
plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up contestation of 
the World Health Organization (WHO). 
 Keywords:  constitutionalisation ;  international authority ;  multilateral 
institutions ;  regime complexity ;  regime shifting 
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 328  christian kreuder-sonnen and bernhard zangl 
 I.  Introduction 
 Today’s global order is marked by a proliferation of mostly issue-area 
speciﬁ c multilateral institutions. As a consequence of the resulting 
institutional density, more and more often the regulatory scopes of 
multilateral institutions partially overlap with one another. There are, 
thus, not only separate issue-area speciﬁ c regimes, but also ‘regime 
complexes’ (e.g. Alter and Meunier  2009 ). As there is usually no superior 
authority to coordinate among the speciﬁ c regimes of a complex, their 
regulatory overlap can be exploited by states (and non-state actors) to 
pursue their interests. They may use one multilateral institution to challenge 
another such institution and thus engage in  contested multilateralism (CM) 
(Morse and Keohane  2014 ). The literature has highlighted two dominant 
strategies in this regard:  regime-shifting that occurs when a coalition of 
actors moves the regulation of an issue from the original institution to 
an existing competing institution that better reﬂ ects their interests; and 
 competitive regime-creation that occurs when a dissatisﬁ ed coalition of 
actors creates a new institution alongside the original institution to promote 
regulations that better reﬂ ect their interests. 
 In this article, we discuss the consequences of CM for the 
constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions. In general, global 
constitutionalisation refers to processes by which the international legal 
order comes to embrace principles of constitutionalism such as human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Milewicz  2009 ; Klabbers, Peters 
and Ulfstein  2009 ; Wiener  et al.  2012 ). As pillars of the international legal 
order, multilateral institutions may exercise authority in ways that reﬂ ect 
these principles to a greater or lesser extent. We therefore deﬁ ne the 
constitutionalisation of speciﬁ c multilateral institutions as the degree 
to which their exercise of authority is legally constrained in terms of 
democratic participation and judicial accountability. These features, we 
hold, represent the institutional expression of constitutionalist principles 
in delineated political orders (see Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl  2015 for 
more details). 
 While the literature often highlights CM’s harmful consequences for global 
constitutionalism (e.g. Benvenisti and Downs  2007 ), we claim that its 
consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions can 
be negative but also positive. In doing so, we shed light on two ‘blind 
spots’ in the concept of contested multilateralism that we expect to be 
particularly relevant for its consequences for the constitutionalisation of 
international institutions. First, we argue in  section II that CM is not 
always driven by actors’ dissatisfaction with the policies of multilateral 
institutions, but can also stem from their dissatisfaction with the legal 
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Varieties of contested multilateralism  329 
structure of an institution’s political order, i.e. its polity. We conceptualise 
this  polity-driven CM as opposed to the common  policy-driven CM and 
hold that the co-existence of constitutionalised and non-constitutionalised 
institutions in the contemporary global order is a frequent trigger of this 
type of CM. Second, we argue in  section III that CM is not always state-led 
(or institution-led), but can also be society-led. Importantly, we claim that 
this neglected differentiation between state- and society-led CM is decisive 
for its consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions. 
CM is likely to have negative consequences when the member states of a 
constitutionalised institution engage in  top-down CM to enhance their 
freedom to wield discretionary authority; but it is likely to have positive 
consequences when society actors engage in  bottom-up CM to reduce 
states’ freedom to wield discretionary authority provided by a non-
constitutionalised institution. In  section IV we then illustrate the empirical 
plausibility of our claims in two cases involving top-down contestation 
of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and bottom-up 
contestation of the World Health Organization (WHO).  1  In  section V 
we summarise our claims and reﬂ ect upon the normative implications of 
polity-driven contested multilateralism. 
 II.  Conceptualising polity-driven contested multilateralism 
 The fragmented character of the global order enables both state and non-state 
actors to challenge an existing multilateral institution by shifting issues to 
an alternative multilateral institution (Morse and Keohane  2014 : 385–7). 
While Morse and Keohane ( 2014 : 386) point out that this contested 
multilateralism can be employed to promote both ‘policy and institutional 
change’, their empirical illustrations – in line with the majority of 
contributions in the literature – focus on instances of CM where the source 
of dissatisfaction with an existing institution is its substantive norms or 
decisions. This  policy-driven contested multilateralism implies that state 
or non-state actors employ an alternative multilateral institution in order 
to challenge the policies of an established multilateral institution. For 
example, in 1992 Norway, Greenland and Iceland created the North 
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) as an alternative 
multilateral institution to deal with whaling issues, because they were 
dissatisﬁ ed with the continuation of the whaling moratorium enacted 
by the International Whaling Commission (IWC). By contrast, a second 
 1  Note that we use the term ‘contestation’ in a generic way as it is implied in the concept 
of CM. 
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 330  christian kreuder-sonnen and bernhard zangl 
type of CM has so far largely been neglected:  polity-driven contested 
multilateralism. Here, the source of dissatisfaction is structural aspects of 
an institution’s political order. It thus implies that state or non-state actors 
draw on an alternative multilateral institution with the aim of challenging 
the polity of an established multilateral institution. The UK initiative 
for the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 as 
an intergovernmental alternative to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) with its supranational institutions may serve as an example. 
 This latter type of CM appears to have important consequences for 
the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions, because state and 
non-state actors that are dissatisﬁ ed with the constitutional quality 
of an existing multilateral institution may employ a less (or more) 
constitutionalised institution in order to undermine (improve) its level of 
constitutionalisation. To study associated strategies of CM, we distinguish 
four different types of multilateral institutions (Kreuder-Sonnen and 
Zangl  2015 ). The typology rests on two fundamental distinctions: Firstly, 
we ask whether political authority relations in multilateral institutions are 
structured in an  intergovernmental or  supranational fashion, i.e. whether 
states retain full sovereignty or whether sovereignty is pooled and/or 
delegated within the institution (Hooghe and Marks  2015 ). Secondly, 
we ask whether or not political authority in multilateral institutions is 
 constrained by law , i.e. whether the institution grants basically unlimited 
discretion to authority-holders or whether authority is legally constrained 
through democratic and judicial processes. 
 Crossing the two distinctions – supranational versus intergovernmental 
authority and legally constrained versus legally unconstrained authority – 
we arrive at a typology of four multilateral institutional arrangements (see 
 Table 1 ).  2  Manifestations of each of these types can be found in co-existing 
sub-orders of the European Union (see Dawson  2015 ) which we use for 
illustrative purposes here:
  
  •  Institution of sovereignty : The institution of sovereignty implies that 
state governments constitute each other as sovereign actors who may 
exercise authority without any international legal constraints. Except for 
acknowledging their sovereign counterparts’ authority, states may wield 
authority with almost unlimited discretion. Any legal constraints on states 
authority are not international, but domestic constraints which may (or 
may not) be subject to democratic and/or judicial accountability. Even 
within today’s EU we can still ﬁ nd areas such as armament in which EU 
members are barely constrained by European law. 
 2  Note that both distinctions can also be conceived as opposing end points of two gradual 
scales (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl  2015 ). 
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Varieties of contested multilateralism  331 
  •  Contractual institutions : In contractual institutions state governments 
constitute each other as sovereign authorities while at the same time 
constraining their authority by mutual agreement. Retaining sovereignty 
implies that states are not committed to any international agreement 
without their (continuous) consent. It also implies that they have full 
discretion over the content of international agreements which – at best – 
can be subject to domestic – but not international – democratic and/or 
judicial accountability. At least in areas such as foreign policy in which 
the intergovernmental method of policymaking applies, today’s EU can 
be understood as a contractual institution. In these areas, Member States 
have not pooled or delegated authority on the EU level, but engage 
in decision-making by consensus. While merely subject to domestic 
accountability mechanisms of national parliaments and national courts, 
these agreements still constrain the discretion states usually enjoy with 
regard to their foreign policy (Dawson  2015 ). 
  •  Constitutionalised Institutions : In constitutionalised multilateral 
institutions, states have pooled or delegated parts of their sovereignty to 
a supranational organisation and established legal constraints on the 
wielding of supranational authority. The authority of constitutionalised 
institutions is subject to democratic and judicial accountability on the 
supranational level. The EU provides an example in the area of the 
Common Market in which the community method of policymaking 
applies. Member States have both pooled (Council) and delegated 
(Commission) authority on the EU level and the wielding of this 
supranational authority is subject to the democratic and judicial 
accountability of the European Parliament (which acts as a co-legislator) 
and the European Court of Justice (which acts as a constitutional court) 
(Schimmelfennig and Rittberger  2006 ). 
  •  Discretionary institutions : Multilateral institutions enjoying pooled or 
delegated authority that is not legally constrained through democratic or 
judicial accountability mechanisms can be seen as discretionary – or even 
authoritarian – institutions. Discretionary supranational institutions 
may wield authority with almost unlimited discretion (Kreuder-Sonnen 
 Table 1.  Four types of multilateral institutions 
 Legally unconstrained authority Legally constrained authority 
Supranational authority 
structure 
Discretionary institutions Constitutionalised 
institutions 
Intergovernmental 
authority structure 
Institution of sovereignty Contractual institutions 
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 332  christian kreuder-sonnen and bernhard zangl 
and Zangl  2015 ). The EU is illustrative, at least in areas such as the 
excessive imbalances procedure (EIP) which gives the Commission 
discretionary authority vis-à-vis countries with high budgetary deﬁ cits 
(Scharpf  2013 ). With hardly any legal constraints, the Commission may 
issue ‘recommendations’ which become binding unless rejected by a 
qualiﬁ ed majority in the Council. As the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice are virtually excluded from this procedure, 
the Commission’s powers are also free from democratic and/or judicial 
accountability (Joerges and Weimer  2013 ). 
  
The four types point to the co-existence of fundamentally different multilateral 
institutions in today’s global order (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl  2015 ). 
This co-existence allows state and non-state actors to employ strategies of 
contested multilateralism to cater the constitutionalisation of multilateral 
institutions to their liking. 
 III.  Consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions 
 We hold that the respective CM strategies can have both negative 
 and positive consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral 
institutions. To arrive at this insight, we suggest a second adaptation 
and extension of the conceptual framework of contested multilateralism. 
In its formulation by Morse and Keohane, CM can be either state-led 
or institution-led. Regarding the latter, we agree that supranational 
organisations can play a discrete role in the deployment of CM strategies, 
yet we doubt that it is actually those multilateral institutions themselves 
which shift ‘the focus of [their] activity to a challenging institution with 
different rules and practices’ (Morse and Keohane  2014 : 388). In fact, we 
argue that the actors who do the shifting are either states or  society actors 
who engage in multilateral contestation from the top down (states) or 
from the bottom up (society actors).  3  Importantly, we claim that they do 
so for systematically diverging reasons with opposed consequences for the 
constitutionalisation of the institution in question. 
 When CM is polity-driven and the source of dissatisfaction is the absence 
or existence of legal constraints in a (non-)constitutionalised institution, 
we suggest that CM strategies employed  top-down by states are likely to 
have negative consequences for the constitutionalisation of multilateral 
 3  To highlight this diverging interpretation, the below example of multilateral contestation 
of the UN Security Council’s regime of targeted sanctions against terror suspects explicitly 
reframes a case of CM that Morse and Keohane ( 2014 : 394–8) label ‘institution-led’ as 
‘bottom-up’ or society-led CM. 
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Varieties of contested multilateralism  333 
institutions, while the consequences of CM strategies employed  bottom-up 
by society actors are likely to be positive. The general reason for this is that 
state actors and society actors typically assume different roles in multilateral 
institutions. While state actors (and supranational bodies) are usually in 
the role of authority-holders, society actors (and weak states) assume the 
role of addressees of this authority. These diverging social roles have – as 
we suppose – an impact on their respective support for constitutionalised 
or discretionary institutions: Authority-holders have nothing to fear from 
unconstrained authority. Sometimes they even have a lot to gain from 
discretionary authority as it improves their ability to realise their interests – be 
they self- or other-regarding – in the way they deem appropriate. Addressees 
of authority, by contrast, can hardly ever gain from unconstrained 
authority. As they depend on the democratic and judicial accountability 
mechanisms of constitutionalised institutions to be protected against an 
exercise of authority that is arbitrary or autocratic, addressees of authority 
have a lot to gain from legal constraints on authority.  4  
 Starting from these general predispositions of authority-holders and the 
addressees of authority, we construct top-down and bottom-up CM as 
two ideal-types with diverging consequences for the constitutionalisation 
of multilateral institutions. 
 Top-down polity-contestation 
 Top-down contested multilateralism implies that the member states of an 
international institution – and not society actors – engage in strategies of 
contestation. The  trigger for this type of CM is often states’ dissatisfaction 
with the legal constraints on the authority of constitutionalised institutions. 
In fact, we hypothesise that the more constitutionalised a multilateral 
institution, the stronger the incentives for states to shift to or create an 
alternative institution, because it potentially undermines their ability to 
exercise authority the way they deem appropriate. Even if states accept the 
constitutionalisation of a multilateral institution in principle, they may still 
be dissatisﬁ ed with the resulting legal constraints regarding speciﬁ c issues, 
speciﬁ c actors, or speciﬁ c situations (see also Morse and Keohane  2014 : 
390). Particularly in crisis situations, they may have a strong incentive to 
break free from the legal constraints of constitutionalised institutions. 
 In top-down CM, states opt for regime-shifting or competitive regime-
creation, because the legal constraints of a constitutionalised institution 
 4  To be sure, in particular weak states may also assume the role of authority-addressees 
and thus favour constitutional constraints on international authority. Conversely, in particular 
inﬂ uential society actors can also assume the role of authority-holders and thus favour 
discretionary authority. 
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 334  christian kreuder-sonnen and bernhard zangl 
typically imply sharp limitations to their  internal opportunities for change. 
For the more constitutionalised a multilateral institution, the greater 
the institutional hurdles for change towards more legal discretion. 
Constitutionalised institutions are generally based on quasi-constitutional 
treaties detailing the procedures for ‘constitutional amendment’ which 
regularly require supermajorities and thus complicate formal change from 
within. In addition, constitutionalised institutions exhibit a comparatively 
high degree of judicialisation, which makes informal adaptations difﬁ cult 
to achieve or at least to sustain. Hence, strategies of top-down CM can 
become the only viable option for states to expand the discretion of a 
multilateral institution. 
 In top-down CM, the typical conﬁ guration of states’  external opportunities 
for shifting to or creating alternative multilateral institutions is characterised 
by a broad availability of  exit options , but rather high  exit costs . While exit 
options are generally available because states face no formal barriers to access 
or create alternative multilateral institutions, exit costs are rather high 
because states that are committed to a multilateral institution risk their 
reputation as a reliable partner among fellow members when shifting to or 
creating a competitive institution. Therefore, while states usually have exit 
options available, their readiness to use them for top-down strategies of 
contested multilateralism is often tempered by comparatively high exit costs. 
 Yet, if exit costs are not prohibitively high, states that are dissatisﬁ ed 
with the legal constraints of a constitutionalised institution will typically 
shift to or create a multilateral institution with more legal discretion. 
Therefore, the  consequences for constitutionalisation of top-down CM 
are typically  negative : either the original institution lowers its level of 
constitutionalisation to correspond to demands of dissatisﬁ ed states for 
the sake of reintegration ( adaptation ); or the original institution is more 
permanently sidelined and the issue dealt with in a discretionary institution 
( displacement ) – thus lowering the aggregate level of constitutionalisation. 
 The contestation of the World Bank’s International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) through the competitive creation 
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 provides an 
example. A coalition of emerging powers led by China had been dissatisﬁ ed 
with the institutional structures of the World Bank. Among other things, 
that dissatisfaction arose from the Bank’s legal constraints on lending 
for large-scale infrastructure projects and the respective accountability 
mechanism of the so-called Inspection Panel.  5  For years, this coalition 
pushed for internal reforms of the World Bank. Yet the coalition of 
 5  To be sure, we do not claim that this case of CM is purely polity-driven – policy concerns 
and status inconsistencies of the rising powers certainly played a role as well. 
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Varieties of contested multilateralism  335 
established states that had promoted the legal constraints on lending 
and the accountability mechanism of the Inspection Panel resisted any 
substantial change (Vestergaard and Wade  2013 ). As a consequence, a 
coalition of emerging powers ﬁ rst launched the New Development Bank 
and later the AIIB as alternative institutions. Both institutions lend money 
for infrastructural projects with hardly any legal constraints and no 
accountability mechanisms comparable to the Inspection Panel. As a 
consequence, the level of constitutionalisation in the World Bank is already 
being questioned by those who fear a competitive disadvantage for the 
Bank’s lending operations (Heupel  2016 ). 
 In sum, we hold that top-down CM typically occurs if states are 
dissatisﬁ ed with the legal constraints of a constitutionalised institution 
that offers limited internal opportunities for change towards more legal 
discretion. If exit costs are not prohibitively high, they use the external 
opportunities of shifting to or creating more discretionary multilateral 
institutions. This, then, has negative consequences for the constitutionalisation 
of the respective institutions (see  Table 2 ). 
 Bottom-up polity-contestation 
 Bottom-up contested multilateralism implies that society actors – instead 
of states – engage in strategies of multilateral contestation. The  trigger for 
this type of CM is often society actors’ dissatisfaction with the unconstrained 
exercise of authority by a discretionary institution. In fact, we hypothesise 
that the more discretionary a multilateral institution, the more likely it 
 Table 2.  Ideal-types of top-down and bottom-up contested multilateralism 
 Top-down (state-led) CM Bottom-up (society-led) CM 
Trigger Exercise of authority as desired 
by states is hampered by legal 
constraints of constitutionalised 
institution
Exercise of authority by 
discretionary institution 
encroaches on society actors’ 
rights 
Internal 
opportunities 
More legal discretion is difﬁ cult to 
achieve for states due to many 
veto-players in constitutionalised 
institutions
More legal constraints are 
difﬁ cult to achieve for lack of 
access for society actors to 
discretionary institutions 
External 
opportunities 
 Exit options are typically available, 
but  exit costs are often high
 Exit costs are typically low, but 
 exit options are often not 
available 
Consequences Negative consequences for 
constitutionalisation 
(adaptation or displacement)
Positive consequences for 
constitutionalisation 
(adaptation or displacement) 
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is that society actors try to constrain its authority. In particular, if the 
institution’s exercise of discretionary authority infringes on society actors’ 
rights, we expect these actors to have a strong incentive to push for the 
constitutionalisation of the respective institution. 
 In bottom-up CM, society actors opt for regime-shifting or competitive 
regime-creation because the authority structures of a discretionary institution 
typically impose sharp limitations to their  internal opportunities for change. 
For the more discretionary a multilateral institution, the greater the 
institutional hurdles for society actors to push for more legal constraints 
within the institution. Discretionary institutions usually provide access only 
to (member) states; as opposed to their constitutionalised counterparts, they 
neither facilitate participation of society actors nor provide them with 
judicial avenues to be heard. There are, thus, no institutionalised mechanisms 
through which society actors could claim their rights. Hence, as internal 
opportunities are limited in discretionary institutions, strategies of CM are 
usually the more promising option for society actors to press for legal 
constraints on the institutions’ authority. 
 In bottom-up CM,  external opportunities to employ strategies of 
multilateral contestation are usually limited by the availability of  exit 
options , but at the same time facilitated by relatively low  exit costs . There 
are two limitations on society actors’ exit options: First, society actors often 
lack access to alternative multilateral institutions to which they could shift 
in order to push the original institution towards more constitutionalisation. 
Second, for lack of political authority, society actors cannot easily create 
international institutions which are comparable to the original institution 
created by states. If, however, exit options are available because a more 
constitutionalised institution is accessible, society actors have to be much 
less concerned with the kind of exit costs which may prevent state actors 
from engaging in CM. As society actors are usually not members of 
international institutions and thus cannot lose their reputation as cooperation 
partners in international institutions, shifting to or creating an alternative 
institution hardly produces any exit costs for them. Thus, bottom-up CM 
depends much less on exit costs, but much more on exit options than 
top-down contestation. 
 If exit options are available, society actors that are dissatisﬁ ed with the 
legally unconstrained exercise of authority by a discretionary institution 
will typically shift to or create a multilateral institution with more legal 
constraints. Therefore, the  consequences for constitutionalisation of 
bottom-up CM are typically  positive. Either the original institution reacts 
to the external challenge by accommodating its concerns ( adaptation ), 
or it is likely to lose social legitimacy which undermines its authority 
( displacement ). 
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 The contestation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)’s 
regime of targeted sanctions against terror suspects may serve as an 
example. By establishing a blacklist for terror suspects that obliged all 
states to freeze the bank accounts of the listed individuals without 
providing them with any form of legal remedy, the UNSC infringed on 
basic due process rights of the targeted persons. Affected individuals, 
supported by a transnational coalition of civil-society actors, were 
dissatisﬁ ed with the Council’s unconstrained exercise of authority. Yet, as 
the discretionary character of the UNSC did not grant them access, they 
were precluded from internally claiming their rights let alone advocating 
more legal constraints on the Council’s authority. They had to turn to 
more constitutionalised institutions to which they had access: the Council 
of Europe (CoE), the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), and, most 
importantly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). While the former two 
publicly criticised the Council’s practice, it was the latter with its famous 
 Kadi rulings that brought the desired effect. The ECJ found the EU 
regulation implementing the UNSC resolution to violate the plaintiff’s 
right to a fair process and thus made the implementation of the UNSC 
resolution in the EU conditional on the introduction of legal remedies 
for the listed individuals. In response, the Council felt compelled to 
institutionalise effective complaint procedures, increasing its level of 
constitutionalisation (Heupel  2013 ). 
 In sum, we claim that discretionary institutions drive society actors 
to employ bottom-up CM, especially when they violate their rights. As 
discretionary institutions generally provide little internal opportunities 
for them to change the institution towards more legal constraints, society 
actors are likely to draw on the external opportunities provided by 
alternative institutions. If adequate exit options are available, they are likely 
to employ a constitutionalised institution in order to constrain the authority 
of a discretionary institution. Therefore, bottom-up polity-contestation is 
expected to have positive consequences for constitutionalisation of the 
respective institution (see  Table 2 ). 
 IV.  Two illustrative cases 
 The above prominent cases of polity-driven CM merely illustrate the 
plausibility of bottom-up and top-down CM as ideal types. In the following 
we demonstrate that the patterns of top-down and bottom-up CM can 
also be observed in less prominent cases. First, we look at the top-down 
contestation of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
through the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); and 
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second, we study the bottom-up contestation of the WHO’s emergency 
governance through the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. 
 Top-down polity-contestation of the EMU 
 Since its inception in the early 1990s, the EMU imposed legal constraints 
on the exercise of authority by both states and supranational organs. 
While ﬁ scal and economic policymaking remained an exclusive competence 
of the Member States, they nevertheless constrained their authority 
by agreeing on certain regulative parameters for their policies (e.g. the 
Stability and Growth Pact) which were even backed by delegated monitoring 
and enforcement powers for the Commission. Monetary policy, on the 
other hand, became an integrated Union competence, but also faced strong 
legal constraints provided in EU primary law. For example, in order to 
tackle the moral hazard problem of non-optimal currency areas, Article 
125(1) TFEU (the so-called no-bailout clause) prohibits the assumption of 
or liability for government commitments across Member States or by the 
Union. Moreover, any supranational acts of authority were subject to 
judicial review by the ECJ, which also protected the economic and social 
rights of individuals or private entities in the EU. 
 In the early days of the euro crisis, many EU Member State governments 
became dissatisﬁ ed with these legal constraints as the exigencies of the 
apparent emergency situation seemed to suggest measures incompatible 
with the existing EMU’s legal order. Many Member States saw the solution 
in ﬁ scal transfers to deﬁ cit countries coupled with strict ﬁ scal conditionalities 
to be supranationally implemented and supervised (e.g. Gocaj and Meunier 
 2013 ). Given the perceived urgency of the matter, however, internal 
institutional adaptation proved impossible. For one thing, an informal 
change of the Treaties was dismissed for fear of the ECJ and especially the 
German Constitutional Court denouncing such an approach as illegal. On 
the other hand, a formal Treaty revision was deemed too lengthy and seemed 
unlikely to be successful in light of the high constitutional hurdles for 
Treaty amendment (e.g. national referenda). In this situation, euro area 
Member States more or less collectively decided to establish an alternative 
multilateral institution, the ESM, with much fewer legal constraints on 
authority, outside the EU’s legal framework.  6  
 The ESM gives euro area Member States the possibility to provide 
emergency credits to ﬁ nancially distressed members of the common 
currency and thus to circumvent the no-bailout clause (Tomkin  2013 ). 
 6  For a similar interpretation focusing on political rather than legal constraints, see Bickerton, 
Hodson and Puetter  2015 . 
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It also enables them to delegate authority to the so-called Troika consisting 
of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose strict ﬁ scal conditionalities 
on recipient states and thus to demand and supervise reforms in issue areas 
such as health care, education and labour law, which have enormous 
distributional effects. Not only are those states thus factually stripped of 
their ﬁ scal sovereignty and budgetary autonomy guaranteed under EU law 
(Dawson and de Witte  2013 : 825), the Troika’s operations also interfere 
with economic and social rights of individuals and entities in countries 
receiving ESM credits (Fischer-Lescano  2014 ). Since the ESM operates 
outside the EU’s legal system, the Troika is not subject to judicial review 
by the ECJ and affected individuals try in vain to claim their rights in front 
of the Court (Kilpatrick  2015 : 348–52). Hence, the ESM establishes a 
discretionary regime competing with the constitutionalised EMU which 
has lost most of its relevance since the establishment of the ESM. Formally, 
the EMU’s legal order has so far remained unaltered, but the factual shift 
of both euro area Member States and the European institutions to the 
discretionary alternative forum underlines the fact that this case of 
top-down polity-contestation had substantively negative effects on the 
constitutionalisation of the whole institutional complex. 
 Bottom-up polity-contestation of the WHO 
 In the wake of the SARS crisis of 2003, the WHO has been delegated a 
considerable amount of supranational authority by member states to deal 
with Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC). As 
provided in the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), the WHO 
Director-General may, in consultation with an Emergency Committee 
of health experts, determine that a spreading disease or another public 
health event constitutes a PHEIC and then issue temporary emergency 
recommendations to be followed by the member states concerned (see 
generally Fidler  2005 ). While legally limited in the contours of the types of 
measures it may adopt and the procedures to follow, the WHO’s emergency 
regime was still established as broadly discretionary – with hardly any 
‘check’ on its authority, let alone a possibility for judicial review or 
democratic accountability (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen  2014 ). This 
was underscored by the WHO’s handling of the 2009–10 H1N1 swine 
inﬂ uenza (the ‘swine ﬂ u’) where it put the new institutional framework 
into practice for the ﬁ rst time. The Director-General convened the 
Emergency Committee and drew on its advice to declare the swine ﬂ u a 
PHEIC, but also to declare it an inﬂ uenza pandemic, which triggered 
worldwide pandemic preparedness plans and led especially wealthy states 
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to pay billions of euros to purchase and stockpile vaccines and antiviral 
medication – much of which eventually proved unnecessary and remained 
unused. The organisation’s decision-making process was highly intransparent. 
Not only did the Emergency Committee operate in complete secrecy with 
the names of the experts being released only after the PHEIC had been 
declared over in 2010, the WHO also autonomously changed the deﬁ nition 
of a pandemic to ﬁ t the characteristics of the swine ﬂ u (Doshi  2011 ). 
In light of the close ties of many WHO advisers to the pharmaceutical 
industry, this led to allegations of conﬂ icts of interest and corporate 
regulatory capture (Cohen and Carter  2010 ). 
 Protest against this discretionary exercise of authority arose in particular 
in the European public health community, including the editors of the 
inﬂ uential  British Medical Journal (Godlee  2010 ), critical investigative 
journalists, and parliamentarians specialising in health policy. Yet these 
society actors lacked access to the WHO which is why their demands for 
a thorough investigation into the allegations and the introduction of better 
accountability structures in the organisation where not channelled internally. 
This was also due to the fact that most member state governments had 
little interest in elucidating the WHO’s crisis politics for fear of being 
drawn into a scandal of inappropriate governance, which also shielded the 
organisation from public pressure (Deshman  2011 : 1108–10). This is why 
parliamentarians eventually shifted to an alternative multilateral institution 
with more democratic representation, i.e. the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, where they could launch a public investigation into 
the WHO’s handling of the H1N1 inﬂ uenza (see Deshman  2011 ). After 
some months of research and after summoning the Director-General and 
other high-ranking WHO ofﬁ cials for questioning before the investigating 
commission, the CoE Assembly published its Report entitled ‘The handling 
of the H1N1 pandemic – more transparency needed’, in which it notes and 
admonishes grave shortcomings in terms of transparency and accountability 
in the WHO’s crisis governance.  7  
 According to Deshman ( 2011 ), the CoE thus emerged as a ‘horizontal 
check’ on the otherwise unconstrained WHO. This bottom-up multilateral 
polity-contestation also had positive, albeit modest, effects on the WHO’s 
level of constitutionalisation (see Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen  2014 : 
342–3). The CoE report threatened to undermine the WHO’s credibility 
and thus its legitimacy as an expert authority. As a reaction, the WHO 
established its own Review Committee to assess the functioning of the 
IHR during the ﬁ rst PHEIC which would eventually, of course, whitewash 
 7  CoE, Parliamentary Assembly, ‘The handling of the H1N1 pandemic: more transparency 
needed’ Report, Social Health and Family Affairs Committee, 24 June 2010, paras 64–65. 
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the organisation in terms of the suspicions about undue corporate inﬂ uence, 
but – critically – also recommend procedural improvements to increase 
transparency and accountability.  8  These recommendations were endorsed 
by the World Health Assembly in 2012 and led to some effective procedural 
adaptations regarding conﬂ icts of interest and the openness of the work of 
the Emergency Committee. 
 V.  Conclusion 
 The ambition of this article was to show a) that strategies of contested 
multilateralism do affect the constitutional qualities of multilateral institutions, 
especially when contestation is  polity-driven , not  policy-driven , b) that 
this form of contested multilateralism does have both positive and negative 
consequences for the constitutionalisation of international institutions, 
and c) that positive consequences are likely to emanate from society 
actors dissatisﬁ ed with the discretionary exercise of authority by 
an existing multilateral institution ( bottom-up ), whereas negative 
consequences are likely to emanate from states that are dissatisﬁ ed 
with the legal constraints of an existing constitutionalised multilateral 
institution ( top-down ). 
 To be sure, the status of our argument is analytical, not normative. 
We make claims about the consequences of top-down and bottom-up 
CM for the constitutionalisation of multilateral institutions. But we do 
not make a conclusive statement about the normative (un-)desirability 
of either type of CM. While changes in an institution’s constitutional 
quality can be considered an important criterion for the normative 
assessment of CM, it is merely one. Any normative assessment of these 
CM strategies depends on the concrete balancing of various such 
criteria. In fact, one may argue that the top-down contestation of the 
EMU may have had negative consequences for its constitutionalisation 
but was still normatively justiﬁ ed to help the ﬁ nancially distressed 
Member States and safeguard the common currency as a whole. 
Similarly, one may argue that the top-down contestation of the WHO 
may have had positive effects on its constitutionalisation but was still 
normatively undesirable because it undermined the WHO’s readiness to 
proactively address subsequent global health threats. While we personally 
disagree on both accounts, we accept that such a balancing of different 
normative standards is necessary to adequately assess top-down and 
bottom-up CM. 
 8  WHA Doc A/64/10, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the 
International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 5 May 2011. 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
20
45
38
17
16
00
01
50
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 W
is
se
ns
ch
af
ts
ze
nt
ru
m
 fu
r 
So
zi
al
fo
rs
ch
un
g,
 o
n 
08
 N
ov
 2
01
7 
at
 1
0:
13
:0
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 342  christian kreuder-sonnen and bernhard zangl 
 Acknowledgements 
 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the colloquium of the 
WZB’s Center for Global Constitutionalism in April 2016 and at the 
Workshop ‘Power Transitions and Institutional Change’ in Freising in 
June 2016. We thank the participants in these forums for their valuable 
comments and criticism. 
 References 
 Alter ,  Karen J. and  Sophie  Meunier .  2009 .  “The Politics of International Regime Complexity.” 
 Perspectives on Politics  7 ( 1 ): 13 – 24 . 
 Benvenisti ,  Eyal and  George  Downs .  2007 .  “The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy 
and the Fragmentation of International Law.”  Stanford Law Review  60 ( 2 ): 595 – 632 . 
 Bickerton ,  Christopher J. ,  Dermot  Hodson and  Uwe  Puetter .  2015 .  “The New 
Intergovernmentalism: European Integration in the Post-Maastricht Era.”  Journal of 
Common Market Studies  53 ( 4 ): 703 –22. 
 Cohen ,  Deborah and  Philip  Carter .  2010 .  “WHO and the pandemic ﬂ u ‘conspiracies’.”  British 
Medical Journal  340 : 1274 –9. 
 Dawson ,  Mark .  2015 .  “The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU 
Economic Governance.”  Journal of Common Market Studies  53 ( 5 ): 976 –93. 
 Dawson ,  Mark and  Floris  de Witte .  2013 .  “Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis.” 
 Modern Law Review  76 ( 5 ): 817 –44. 
 Deshman ,  Abigail .  2011 .  “Horizontal Review between International Organizations: 
Why, How, and Who Cares about Corporate Regulatory Capture.”  European Journal 
of International Law  22 ( 4 ): 1089 – 1113 . 
 Doshi ,  Peter .  2011 .  “The elusive deﬁ nition of pandemic inﬂ uenza.”  Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization  89 ( 7 ): 532 –8. 
 Fidler ,  David P .  2005 .  “From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: 
The New International Health Regulations.”  Chinese Journal of International Law 
 4 ( 2 ): 325 –92. 
 Fischer-Lescano ,  Andreas .  2014 .  Human Rights in Times of Austerity Policy: The EU Institutions 
and the Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding .  Baden-Baden :  Nomos . 
 Gocaj ,  Ledina and  Sophie  Meunier .  2013 .  “Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM, and the Euro 
Crisis.”  Journal of European Integration  35 ( 3 ): 239 –53. 
 Godlee ,  Fiona .  2010 .  “Conﬂ icts of interest and pandemic ﬂ u.”  British Medical Journal 
 340 : c2947 . 
 Hanrieder ,  Tine and  Christian  Kreuder-Sonnen .  2014 .  “WHO decides on the exception? 
Securitization and emergency governance in global health.”  Security Dialogue 
 45 ( 4 ): 331 –48. 
 Heupel ,  Monika .  2013 .  “With power comes responsibility: Human rights protection in United 
Nations sanctions policy.”  European Journal of International Relations  19 ( 4 ): 773 –96. 
 Heupel ,  Monika . Forthcoming  2016 .  “Human Rights Protection in World Bank Lending. 
Following the Lead of the US Congress.” In  International Organizations and the 
Protection of Human Rights , edited by  Monika  Heupel and  Michael  Zürn .  Cambridge : 
 Cambridge University Press . 
 Hooghe ,  Liesbet and  Gary  Marks .  2015 .  “Delegation and pooling in international organizations.” 
 Review of International Organizations  10 ( 3 ): 305 –28. 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
20
45
38
17
16
00
01
50
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 W
is
se
ns
ch
af
ts
ze
nt
ru
m
 fu
r 
So
zi
al
fo
rs
ch
un
g,
 o
n 
08
 N
ov
 2
01
7 
at
 1
0:
13
:0
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Varieties of contested multilateralism  343 
 Joerges ,  Christian and  Maria  Weimer .  2013 .  “A Crisis of Executive Managerialism in the EU: 
No Alternative?” In  Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum 
David M Trubek , edited by  Gráinne  de Búrca ,  Claire  Kilpatrick and  Joanne  Scott , 
 295 – 322 .  Oxford :  Hart Publishing . 
 Kilpatrick ,  Claire .  2015 .  “On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of 
Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts.”  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies  35 ( 2 ): 325 –53. 
 Klabbers ,  Jan ,  Anne  Peters and  Geir  Ulfstein .  2009 .  The Constitutionalization of International 
Law .  Oxford :  Oxford University Press . 
 Kreuder-Sonnen ,  Christian and  Bernhard  Zangl .  2015 .  “Which post-Westphalia? International 
organizations between constitutionalism and authoritarianism.”  European Journal of 
International Relations  21 ( 3 ): 568 –94. 
 Milewicz ,  Karolina .  2009 .  “Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: Toward a 
Conceptual Framework.”  Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies  16 ( 2 ): 413 –36. 
 Morse ,  Julia and  Robert O.  Keohane .  2014 .  “Contested Multilateralism.”  Review of 
International Organizations  9 ( 4 ): 385 – 412 . 
 Scharpf ,  Fritz W .  2013 .  “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Disabling of Democratic 
Accountability.” In  Politics in the Age of Austerity , edited by  Wolfgang  Streeck and 
 Armin  Schäfer ,  108 –42.  Cambridge :  Polity . 
 Schimmelfennig ,  Frank and  Berthold  Rittberger .  2006 .  “Explaining the constitutionalization 
of the European Union.”  Journal of European Public Policy  13 ( 8 ): 1148 –67. 
 Tomkin ,  Jonathan .  2013 .  “Contradiction, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The 
Impact of the Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy.” 
 German Law Journal  14 ( 1 ): 169 –90. 
 Vestergaard ,  Jakob and  Robert H.  Wade .  2013 .  “Protecting Power: How Western States 
Retain the Dominant Voice in The World Bank’s Governance.”  World Development 
 46 : 153 –64. 
 Wiener ,  Antje ,  Anthony F.  Lang ,  Jr. ,  James  Tully ,  Miguel Poiares  Maduro and  Mattias  Kumm . 
 2012 .  “Editorial: Global Constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” 
 Global Constitutionalism  1 ( 1 ): 1 – 15 . 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
20
45
38
17
16
00
01
50
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 W
is
se
ns
ch
af
ts
ze
nt
ru
m
 fu
r 
So
zi
al
fo
rs
ch
un
g,
 o
n 
08
 N
ov
 2
01
7 
at
 1
0:
13
:0
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
/w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
